Commentators were quick to link the May 2024 assassination attempt against Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico to rising political tensions in Europe; they made similar comments about the July 2024 assassination attempt on former U.S. President Donald Trump. "Political violence and polarization stalk Europe today, with ominous echoes of the past,” wrote the New York Times, regarding the attempt on Fico’s life.
Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev drew a parallel between the attempt on Fico’s life and the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which sparked World War I. “Ominous indications of brewing violence go well beyond the shooting of Mr. Fico,” the Times concluded. “The attack on Fico should prompt reflection about what has brought Slovakia to this point,” argued an editorialist in the Financial Times.
Do such arguments make sense? In 1981, the attempted assassination of U.S. President Ronald Reagan – claimed by the attacker to have been an effort to impress the actress Jodie Foster – did not spark general concern about American political stability. The 2022 assassination of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe had apparent political motivations and provoked a scandal regarding donations to religious groups but was not seen as a sign of impending turmoil in Japanese society.
There is a long history of assassinations being used as a political instrument. In the ancient world, assassination was central to the 'game of thrones' by which political leaders contested power. After the fall of the Roman Republic, for instance, rising emperors might be expected to assassinate their political opponents. In Medieval Europe, rising kings would generally be expected to murder their nephews, to avoid risks from rival claimants.
In the medieval era, however, assassination began to take on another, more modern role, as a tool to contest government policy. “The Russian system of absolutism was tempered by assassination,” writes Tim Chapman, in his history of imperial Russia[1]. While the Russian czar wielded almost absolute power, in practice, measures that displeased the nobility were likely to result in assassination attempts – generally carried out by the nobles themselves, although Tsar Paul, for instance, was strangled by army officers acting on orders from the nobility. Hence the risk of assassination appears to have tempered the policy choices of Russian czars.
In the modern era, this use of assassination as a tool to contest policy has persisted, but the perpetrators have changed. Cambridge University historian Rachel Hoffman writes that the transition happened at the turn of the “nineteenth century, [when] political murder was … no longer the preserve of an elite circle of the court and aristocracy; it was now committed by the popular political protestor – the common man.” While assassinating a government figure might seem an act of lunacy – and evidence of mental illness in would-be assassins is not uncommon – some scholars contend that assassinations are a radical form of policy protest.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the frequency of political assassination shares some drivers with the frequency of political protest. For instance, research on post-war Europe has identified a correlation between austerity (government budget cuts or tax increases) and demonstrations; the same research identifies a similar link between austerity and an increase in political assassinations. Arguably, both an assassination (leading to a change of political leadership) and a large-scale demonstration are ways to pressure a government into changing an unpopular policy.
Attempts to explain the motives behind any given single assassination attempt can only be speculative. Assassins are unreliable narrators of their actions – perhaps hiding a conspiracy (as Slovakia’s interior minister has suggested) or suffering from mental illness.
That said, it is not unreasonable to assume that if governments maintain unpopular policies and refuse to change those policies despite sustained conventional protests, the risk of an assassination attempt could grow. The description appears at least to some degree to fit the chain of events in Slovakia (as well as Japan).
In the case of the attempt on Donald Trump’s life, of course, the target was an opposition candidate, not a serving leader. Such assassination attempts may be more rare, but they are by no means unheard of, including in the U.S. For instance, the Louisiana senator Huey Long in 1935 was mounting a credible challenge to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s control of the Democratic Party, until he was shot by a 33-year-old medical doctor. Long’s assassin was immediately gunned down, so motives can only be guessed at. That said, the assassin’s father-in-law was a judge and one of Long’s political enemies.
Huey Long was an intensely controversial figure. He was, like Trump, a populist politician who claimed he would represent the people against an entrenched and corrupt Washington elite (although Long was on the left wing of the Democratic Party). Long had a talent for scandal, misbehavior and awarding his political opponents insulting nicknames (Roosevelt was the “Knight of the Nouhrmal,” a reference to the Astor family yacht on which Roosevelt sometimes holidayed).
In the 1980s, the documentary filmmaker Ken Burns profiled Long’s life. Many of the interviews Burns conducted provide a chilling reminder of U.S. polarization at the time. A journalist, the wife of the editor of an anti-Long daily newspaper in Louisiana, said: “I can’t remember any Saturday night that I went anywhere that we didn’t talk about killing Huey Long – it was just the normal conversation.”[2]
Could that kind of polarization increase the risk of political violence? In the following sections, we address this question, focusing on the situation in Europe.
The assassination attempts against Slovakia’s Prime Minister and a U.S. presidential candidate do not stand alone. The recent assault on the Danish Prime Minister on June 8, coupled with ongoing threats against German officials in May, suggest a potential trend.
However, data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), an independent organization that collects political violence incident data, present a more nuanced picture. According to their report, despite these alarming incidents, overall radical violence in Europe has actually remained stable since 2020. In fact, they documented over 100 violent events in 2023, which is consistent with the figures from previous years.
That said, there are some threats that organizations with operations in Europe should monitor. A phenomenon known as 'cumulative radicalization' occurs when acts of violence by one side of the political spectrum are seen as justification for retaliation by the other. This fuels a feedback loop where each violent act strengthens the narrative of the opposing group, leading to further violence. Street clashes between extremist groups like Germany’s AfD and their left-wing counterparts may exemplify this trend. As these groups become increasingly radicalized, political engagement wanes, replaced by a climate ripe for political unrest.
There is suggestive evidence that in Europe exogenous factors are exacerbating such a situation. For instance, international conflicts like the Israel-Hamas situation have become flashpoints, with European extremist groups rallying behind their perceived allies. This further intensifies domestic tensions and perpetuates the cycle of cumulative radicalization.
In France, far-right groups are increasingly engaging in vigilantism. Recently, these groups have assaulted people of immigrant heritage on the streets, claiming to ‘assist’ police amid intercommunal tensions. The normalization of such extremist views could lead to a future escalation and justification of violence, while disenfranchised communities with historically fraught relations with the police and/or government may feel further aggrieved by perceived cooperation between the right-wing and state authorities.
Greece stands as a cautionary tale, demonstrating how political polarization can morph into a volatile landscape plagued by frequent outbursts of violence. This trend became particularly concerning during the contentious May 2023 elections. Here, ideological divides fueled attacks from both ends of the spectrum. Supporters on the left and right clashed with one another, targeting not just each other, but prominent figures aligned with their opposing viewpoints. Furthermore, violent confrontations between police and anti-government protestors from both sides of the political aisle further exposed the deep chasms fracturing the nation, creating a breeding ground for further violence. Other similarly polarized countries in Europe will undoubtedly hope that the violent tactics used by Greek political organizations do not inspire radical members of their society, for groups in Greece are unique due to their use of improvised explosive devices.
For now, in Europe the main threat comes from political extremists, on both the far-right and far-left, who often operate in clandestine cells or act alone as ‘lone wolves’, making them difficult to detect and prevent.
Unlike large-scale Salafi-jihadist attacks, far-right violence often prioritizes sowing terror and fracturing communities, rather than maximizing casualties. Left-wing extremists, on the other hand, may target specific individuals perceived as prominent right-wing figures, as well as government departments and commercial organizations deemed to complicit in a range of socially contentious issues such as climate change. This suggests a rise in targeted attacks, including assassinations and active shooting scenarios, in addition to property damage and attempts to interrupt business operations.
While these high-profile, lower-casualty attacks pose a serious threat, the potential for larger-scale violence should not be downplayed. A string of successful, under-the-radar attacks could embolden extremists to attempt more ambitious plots, potentially involving explosives or other weapons with a higher casualty count.
The normalization of violence poses a significant security risk. Increased radicalization and polarization within movements, the mainstreaming of hate and violent speech, and the potential weakening of institutions all contribute to a dangerous environment. Historical examples like in Myanmar, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka demonstrate how non-state violence often intensifies when political leaders or elected officials provide legitimacy to extremist views.
While these are extreme cases, they illustrate the risk from a cycle of violence, which creates fertile ground for groups to recruit and embolden their members to resort to violent acts.
The recent wave of attacks on European leaders underscores the growing threat of political violence on the continent. While overall extremist incidents remain stable, the normalization of violent extremism is a rising concern. The increase in far-right parties and political polarization fosters an environment where violence becomes more acceptable.
This normalization, driven by 'cumulative radicalization' — a cycle of escalating violence between opposing sides — threatens European security. Even low-profile attacks can embolden extremists to attempt larger scale plots, and can also erode public trust in state security apparatus’ and the government itself.
To combat this trend, Europe must counter extremist narratives, foster social cohesion, and strengthen institutions. This is because the uncontested circulation of the extremist narrative regardless of the ideology, only ensures that the threat of political violence persists. Leaders must condemn all forms of political violence and work to bridge divides. Only through collective effort can Europe prevent political violence from becoming the new norm.
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