The political and security landscapes of the Central Sahel have been fundamentally altered over the past decade. Many of the transformations witnessed in the region have been caused in part by proliferation of Islamist extremist groups such as the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusratal-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel), and to a lesser extent other armed non-state groups. The spread of JNIM and IS-Sahel southward from northern Mali throughout the country and then into Niger and Burkina Faso has brought with it record levels of violence and displacement; it has also played a major part in all five of the military coup d’etats that have been witnessed across the region since 2020.
These coups have reconfigured the political makeup of each Central Sahelian state, in turn bringing major shifts in their international partnerships. Indeed, aside from becoming the world’s epicenter of terrorism, the Central Sahel has also served as one of the main theatres for geopolitical competition between the West and Russia. And it is Moscow that has emerged largely victorious in this battle for influence in the region, with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all opting to sever ties with France, the U.S., and other international partners in order to forge far closer ties with Moscow – much to the detriment of the regional security environment.
These developments have had wide-ranging implications for the regional operating environment, much to the disadvantage of many who had been active there for years. There are now widespread fears that extreme levels of violence and instability will proliferate throughout West Africa, with significant attacks being noted in Benin and Togo during the past quarter.
So far 2024 has been yet another deadly year for the Central Sahel, with Q3 in particular witnessing a number of attacks that underscored the devastating capabilities of violent extremist groups active in the region. JNIM’s attack on Bamakoon on 17 September rightly garnered much international attention, with militants belonging to the group striking two of the Malian capital’s most sensitive sites, killing over 70 and wounding about 200 others in the process.
This was the most significant attack on a capital in the Central Sahel since 2016 and demonstrated JNIM’s significant operational reach and offensive capabilities.
The incident was particularly concerning due to relative ease with which JNIM fighters were able to access an airbase used by the Malian military and government, located adjacent to the city’s civilian international airport, as well as a gendarme academy in a city previously considered relatively secure from militant violence.
This attack, as remarkable as it was in terms of its sophistication and lethality, was some way off being the deadliest attack in the region during Q3. On 24 August, JNIM militants killed hundreds of people in the Burkina be town of Barsalogho as they dug defensive trenches for the military. As many as 600 people may have perished in this incident, making it the deadliest recorded since Islamist extremist militancy began to impact the region over a decade ago. This attack took place just over a week after JNIM fighters ambushed a massive convoy of military vehicles and civilians near Nassougou, potentially killing over 100 people, and was soon followed by the killing of 26 at a church in Kounla. These attacks contributed to what was JNIM’s most lethal month of 2024 so far, with the number of fatalities claimed by the group in August more than double that of the next most deadly month.
September saw JNIM continue to conduct violent attacks across the region, including in Niger, a country that has also continued to see the rise of new violent non-state actors in Q3.7 These groups were behind some notable attacks, such as one in September perpetrated by the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MPLJ) in the Agadez region, that reportedly left 14 security personnel dead and two others wounded. This incident marked the continuation of violence by anti-junta rebel groups, following two attacks on the Petro China-funded oil pipeline running from Niger to Benin by the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) – which temporarily disabled a section of the pipeline and killed several soldiers – earlier this summer. Anti-junta rebels have the potential to further threaten the national security landscape, with four of the major groups recently announcing they would be joining forces and coordinating attacks under the Coordination of Free Armed Forces (CFLN).
The actions of the Islamic State were overshadowed by the more lethal and spectacular JNIM attacks in the past quarter, although the group remained a potent threat across the Central Sahel, via its Sahel branch (IS-Sahel),and to a lesser extent its West Africa Province (ISWAP). Among the most notable incidents involving the group include two ISWAP IED attacks in the southwest Diffa region that killed five and six soldiers respectively, as well as an IS-Sahel attack on a military base near Eknewane, Tillaberi region that reportedly left 30 soldiers dead and others wounded. The group’s Sahel branch were also behind deadly ambushes on security personnel convoys in Niger’s Dongourou and Mali’s Tabango.
The latter of these two ambushes came at time in which the Malian armed forces were stretched while attempting to confront multiple opponents in the country’s north. Indeed, July saw a longstanding conflict in northern Mali thrust back into the international spotlight, after a convoy composed of Malian and Russian military personnel was sent to retake a border crossing into Algeria near the town of Tinzaouaten from Tuareg rebels belonging to the CSP-DPA. Government-affiliated troops clashed violently with CSP-DPA militants, and occasionally JNIM fighters, over a period of several days. Inclement weather conditions and strong resistance hampered the military’s ability to receive air support considerably, as at least two army helicopters were downed.
After fighting over several days, Malian troops and Russian mercenaries began to retreat, having failed to retake the area, but subsequently fell into a major ambush conducted by both JNIM and CSP-DPA fighters. These reports cannot be fully verified, although investigations by journalists have uncovered that at least 23 Russian nationals and many more Malian soldiers perished in the incident.
The defeat was the biggest single loss of Russian lives in Africa since it began providing military support to governments there in 2017. Moreover, it was a significant blow for the ruling junta, who in recent years have tied much of their legitimacy and prestige to retakings wathes of the country’s north – an area of the Mali which has had a significant influence on the trajectory of the country itself, as well as the wider geopolitical landscape.
The extensive security issues facing the Central Sahel today can be traced back to a Tuareg-initiated rebellion in northern Mali over 12 years ago. In 2012, Tuareg separatists, many of whom went on to form the CSP-DPA, collaborated with Islamist extremists to conquer areas of northern Mali. Although the new State of Azawad was proclaimed by the Tuaregs, they were soon expelled by jihadists from the main cities in the region such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. These Islamist extremists then marched further south and began to seriously threaten central Mali, before France intervened militarily via Operation Serval to halt the offensive.
Operation Serval was largely successful; however, it quickly became clear that the Islamist extremists were going to remain a threat to the region.
Accordingly, the far larger and more encompassing Operation Barkhane was initiated to counter these groups, with international soldiers part of the French-led mission being deployed to a list of Sahelian countries. This counter insurgency operation was significantly less successful than its predecessor, though in hindsight it was the French military’s refusal to allow Malian troops to enter Kidal, alongside the numerous instances of cooperation with Tuareg rebels, that were arguably some of the mission’s greatest downfalls. There were both humanitarian concerns and operational motivations that led to these decisions, however, for many in the Malian military and political circles, these moves were major infringements on their country’s sovereignty.
These grievances were aggravated massively by the increasing levels of violence and conflict in the country, which were only being stemmed partially despite the efforts of international donors, with both JNIM and IS-Sahel making significant territorial gains in Mali, aswell as neighbors Burkina Faso and Niger. This expansion was enabled largely by exploiting the dire humanitarian, social, and economic challenges being experienced by many across the region, circumstances that required far more than a military response alone.
Levels of discontent continued to rise across the Central Sahel throughout the mid-to-late 2010s, before eventually reaching a breaking point in the summer of 2020. That year, on 18 August, Mali was again the scene of a watershed moment. Following weeks of protests in Bamako against then-President Aboubakar Keita – a man seen as corrupt, ineffective, and overly reliant on France – a contingent of Malian soldiers overthrew the leader. This overthrow marked the beginning of the ‘‘coupwave” that has come to impact countries across West Africa, with at least nine coup attempts in the region since. The second of these came just a year later in Mali, where newly installed civilian leader Bah Daw was depose dafter attempting to sideline the military leaders who had placed him in power. Current leader Assimi Goita took charge of the country in place of Daw, a position he holds to this day.
While these regime changes were popular with many in Mali, donor governments, particularly France, became increasingly exacerbated by the political turbulence and bellicose rhetoric that accompanied them, as well as the nascent junta’s resistance toward to implementing a concrete timeline for return to civilian rule. These deteriorating relations ultimately contributed to Operation Barkhane announcing its withdrawal from the country in early 2022; Bamako’s new security partner had begun to arrive in the country just weeks before.
In the years prior, the Russian mercenary Wagner Group, an organization with deep ties to the Kremlin, had gained notoriety for a successful counter insurgency campaign in the Central African Republic. They were then approached by Bamako, which was seeking assistance from alternative sources due to their disputes with their traditional partners. The mercenary group reportedly centered their offer around regime security and restoring the sovereignty that had been “lost” through Western support, with the capture of Kidal from Tuareg separatists at the heart of the deal. In exchange, they would receive $10 million a month, alongside access to some of Mali’s vast gold reserves.
It would be almost two years before Malian and Wagner troops entered Kidal, but the highly symbolic nature of the city’s capture made this victory worth the wait for the junta and many of its supporters, even despite the increasing levels of insecurity. Indeed, violence has escalated markedly since the arrival of Russian security forces, with terrorist groups, government forces, and Wagner mercenaries all contributing to this uptick. Moreover, as the violence around Tinzaouaten this summer demonstrated, their taking of Kidal last November did not mark the end of conflict in northern Mali. Recent reports suggest that another sizeable convoy of government-affiliated troops is making its way toward the border areas around Tinzaouaten once again. The outcome of the latest Malian government-led operations here in the coming days and weeks may have huge ramifications, with the junta’s legitimacy and Russia’s credibility as a security partner both being inherently linked to success in northern Mali.
It is impossible to understand the acute levels of insecurity present in the Central Sahel without examining their origins, with the Tuareg-initiated rebellion triggering a chain of events that facilitated the rise of terrorist groups, forceful changes in government, the withdrawal of the West, and the realignment toward Russia in not only Mali, but also neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. Today, these junta’s have reversed much of the democratic progress that had been made previously, increased their repression and violence toward civilians,and implemented sweeping changes to their primary industries in order to secure their rule.
With the focus of these junta’s primarily on protecting their power, JNIM, IS-Sahel, as well as other violent non-state groups have been offered significant space to expand their violence and territorial control, something Q3 has presented ample examples of. But there are growing signs that this expansion will not be limited to the Central Sahel, as these groups increasingly permeate across the region’s porous borders into new territory. Benin and Togo have been impacted the most over the past quarter. Togo experienced one of its most deadly attacks ever in Q3, with at least six soldiers killed following an attack on a military barracks near Dapaong on 20 July. In Benin, there were at least two confirmed attacks in 8 August and 19 September, which collectively left four security personnel dead. These incidents marked the continuation of an alarming trend in the two countries, where terrorist violence and activity has increased markedly since 2019.
JNIM and IS both continue to show a tremendous capacity to expand their offensive capabilities and territorial control. It is difficult to see the continued proliferation of these extremist groups through the Central Sahel being arrested soon, meaning that levels of insecurity and political instability will likely continue growing in tandem, particularly as other violent non-state actors continue to attack governments simultaneously. Forceful regime changes, attacks on urban centers, indiscriminate killings of civilians, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands all appear distinct possibilities in the Central Sahel over the medium-to-long term.
Overspill from the world’s epicenter of terrorism is becoming an increasing concern for the wider region, locations along the borders with some of these Sahelian states in Benin and Togo are being attacked at a growing rate. Meanwhile, jihadist activity is continuing to be recorded near the borders of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, and Algeria. These countries face a difficult battle combatting this growing threat, with terrorist groups able to threaten them from territory where they are able to operate with relative impunity. For the time being, violence in surrounding countries is likely to remain confined to their border zones near the Sahel; however, as has been seen in recent years, if not countered properly, these threats could continue to permeate deeper through West Africa with lethal effect.
Increased levels of terrorist violence in other West African states will not only raise the security threats there; they will also likely harm political, social, and economic stability, making what are currently stable and secure commercial operating environments increasingly inhospitable.
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